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Congestion Games with Variable Demands
Tobias Harks∗ Max Klimm∗†
Abstract
We initiate the study of congestion games with variable demands where the (variable) demand has
to be assigned to exactly one subset of resources. The players’ incentives to use higher demands are
stimulated by non-decreasing and concave utility functions. The payoff for a player is defined as the
difference between the utility of the demand and the associated cost on the used resources. Although
this class of non-cooperative games captures many elements of real-world applications, it has not been
studied in this generality, to our knowledge, in the past.
We study the fundamental problem of the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE for short) in con-
gestion games with variable demands. We call a set of cost functions C consistent if every congestion
game with variable demands and cost functions in C possesses a PNE. We say that C is FIP consistent
if every such game possesses the α-Finite Improvement Property for every α > 0. Our main results are
structural characterizations of consistency and FIP consistency for twice continuously differentiable cost
functions. Specifically, we show
1. C is consistent if and only if C contains either only affine functions or only homogeneously expo-
nential functions (c(ℓ) = a eφℓ).
2. C is FIP consistent if and only if C contains only affine functions.
Our results provide a complete characterization of consistency of cost functions revealing structural
differences to congestion games with fixed demands (weighted congestion games), where in the latter
even inhomogeneously exponential functions are FIP consistent.
Finally, we study consistency and FIP consistency of cost functions in a slightly different class of
games, where every player experiences the same cost on a resource (uniform cost model). We give
a characterization of consistency and FIP consistency showing that only homogeneously exponential
functions are consistent.
1 Introduction
Resource allocation problems play a key role in many applications. Whenever a set of resources needs to be
matched to a set of demands, the goal is to find the most profitable or least costly allocation of the resources
to the demands. Examples of such applications come from a wide range of areas, most prominently traffic
networks [4, 28, 30, 32] and telecommunication networks [16, 17, 31]. In most of the above applications,
the allocation of resources is determined by a finite number of independent players, each optimizing an in-
dividual objective function. A natural framework for analyzing such non-cooperative games are congestion
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games as introduced by Rosenthal [27]. In a congestion game, there is a set of resources and a pure strategy
of a player consists of a subset of resources. The cost of a resource depends only on the number of players
choosing the resource, and the private cost of a player is the sum of the costs of the chosen resources. Under
these assumptions, Rosenthal proved the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE for short).
In the past, the existence of PNE has been analyzed in many variants of congestion games such as
scheduling, routing, facility location, network design, each variant with unweighted and weighted players,
see [1, 3, 5, 9, 14, 20]. Most of these previous works have a common feature: given a set of resources whose
cost increases with increasing congestion, every player allocates a fixed demand to an available subset.
While obviously important, such models do not take into account a fundamental property of many real-world
applications: the intrinsic coupling between the quality or cost of the resources and the resulting demands
for the resources. A prominent example of this coupling is the flow control problem in telecommunication
networks. In this setting, players receive a non-negative utility from sending data and the perceived costs
increase with congestion. In this and other examples, the demands will be reduced if the resources are
congested, and increased if the resources are uncongested. Allowing for variable demand is, thus, a natural
prerequisite for modeling the tradeoff between the benefit for demand, and the quality of the resource.
There is a large body of work addressing the issue of variable demands: [6, 19, 17, 29, 31] in the context
of telecommunication networks and [4, 13] in the context of traffic networks. Most of these works assume
that the (variable) demand may be fractionally distributed over the available subsets of resources. This
assumption together with convexity assumptions on the cost and utility functions implies the existence of
a PNE by Rosen’s theorem [26]. Allowing a fractional distribution of the demand, however, is obviously
not possible in many applications. For instance, the standard TCP/IP protocol suite uses single path routing,
because splitting the demand comes with several practical complications, e.g., packets arriving out of order,
packet jitter due to different paths delays etc.
We initiate the study of congestion games with variable demands, where the (variable) demand has to be
assigned to exactly one subset of resources. We impose standard economic assumptions (cf. [13, 17, 29])
that every player is associated with a non-decreasing and concave utility function measuring the utility for
the demand. The payoff for a player is defined as the difference between the utility and the associated
congestion cost on the used resources where the cost of a player on a resource is the product of the cost
function, and the player’s demand.
There are two fundamental goals from a system design perspective: (i) the system must be stabilizable,
that is, there must be a stable point (PNE) from which no player wants to unilaterally deviate; (ii) myopic
play of the players should guide the system to a stable state. Because the utility functions are only known to
the players (as they are private information) and not available to the system designer, we study the above two
issues with respect to the used cost functions (which represent the technology associated with the resources,
e.g., queuing discipline at routers, latency function in transportation networks, etc.). Let C be a set of cost
functions and let G(C) be the set of all congestion games with variable demands and cost functions in C. We
say that C is consistent if every game in G(C) possesses a PNE. We say that C is FIP consistent if for every
game in G(C), every sequence of unilateral α-improvements (improvements that add at least α to the payoff
of the deviating player, see [21]) is finite. The main goal of this work is to investigate consistency and the
α-FIP of the used cost functions.
Connection to Prior Work. Already earlier work recognized the importance of understanding the impact
of the cost structure on the existence of PNE and the α-FIP in variants of congestion games, see [2, 8,
18, 23, 26]. The existence of PNE with respect to the cost structure also plays a fundamental role in the
vast literature on Cournot oligopoly games in the economic theory of imperfect competition. In a Cournot
oligopoly game, there is a set of firms each producing quantities so as to satisfy an elastic demand. The
production cost for every player is modeled by a convex cost function and the interaction between the firms
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comes from the price determination mechanism which is dependent on the total supply on the market. Note
that congestion games with variable demands can be interpreted as a natural generalization of the Cournot
oligopoly game. In [15] it is proved that Cournot oligopoly games are basically equivalent (in terms of the
set of Nash equilibria) to congestion games with variable demand and a single resource (which are termed
Cournot oligopsonies in [15]). The model proposed in this article is more general since the strategy space
of players involves not only quantities but also sets of allowable subsets of resources (markets).
The pioneering work of Cournot [7] established the existence of an equilibrium point for this model
assuming zero costs and concave inverse demand functions. Further existence results for more general cost
functions have been established by many researchers, among others [22, 25].
In the seminal paper by Orda et al. [23], the authors address the issue of uniqueness of PNE in congestion
games with splittable demands. They give sufficient conditions for uniqueness of PNE for several classes of
cost functions. In the final section of their paper, the following question is raised (we quote from the paper):
”Several other open questions of practical value deserve attention. For example, in many networks users
are restricted to route their flow along a single path with strict rules of changing them. Under such
circumstances an NEP may not exist at all and complicated oscillatory behavior is likely to arise.”
Our Results. We initiate the study of congestion games with variable demands and focus on the existence
of pure Nash equilibria and the finite improvement property. Our main results are structural characterizations
of the existence of PNE and the α-FIP with respect to the cost structure. Specifically, we show the following:
1. Let C be a set of non-negative, strictly increasing and twice differentiable cost functions. We prove
that C is consistent if and only if exactly one of the following cases hold: (a) C contains only affine
functions c(ℓ) = ac ℓ + bc with ac > 0, bc ≥ 0; (b) C contains only homogeneously exponential
functions such that c(ℓ) = ac eφℓ for some ac, φ > 0, where ac may depend on c, while φ must be equal
for all c ∈ C. Moreover, we characterize the α-FIP in congestion games with variable demands. We
prove that C is FIP consistent if and only if C contains only affine functions. The formal results appear
as Theorems 4.4 and 4.5.
We show that our results remain valid for games with network structure and, thus, our characteriza-
tions settle the open questions raised by Orda et al. [23].
2. We then investigate a slightly different class of games that we term uniform games. They differ from
the previously studied games in the definition of the players’ payoff functions. In uniform games the
cost for a player on a resource is not multiplied with the demand of that player. For fixed demands,
uniform games have been studied by many researchers, e.g., [8, 9, 14, 20]. Considering uniform
cost structures is motivated by a series of real-world applications. In large-scale telecommunication
networks, it is highly desirable to charge every player the same cost regardless of the actual resource
consumption of every player, because every resource needs only to communicate a single value to
the players giving rise to an efficient and scalable implementation [31]. In scheduling applications,
the cost function is frequently used to model the achieved makespan which is (under round-robin
processing) equal for every job on the same resource.
Our second main result provides a complete characterization of consistency of a set of cost functions
for the uniform cost model. We prove that C is consistent w.r.t. uniform cost games if and only if
C contains homogeneously exponential functions such that c(ℓ) = ac eφℓ for some ac, φ > 0, where
ac may depend on c, while φ must be equal for all c ∈ C. Surprisingly, this characterization reveals
that uniform games need not possess a PNE, even if costs are affine. We also characterize the α-FIP
in the uniform cost model. We prove that C is FIP consistent if and only if C = ∅. For the case of
homogeneously exponential cost functions, however, we derive an improvement dynamic converging
to a PNE, thus, showing that the improvement graphs of the resulting games are weakly acyclic.
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Table 1: Existence of PNE and the α-FIP in congestion games with variable demands with proportional costs and uniform costs.
Note the fundamental structural difference to weighted congestion games (with fixed demands) where in the proportional and
uniform cost model there is always a PNE and the α-FIP for affine and inhom. exponential cost functions, see [8, 11, 12, 24].
variable demands variable demands fixed demands
proportional costs uniform costs prop. & unif. costs
cost functions PNE α-FIP PNE α-FIP PNE α-FIP
affine yes yes no no yes [8] yes [8]
hom. exp. yes no yes no yes [24] yes [24]
inhom. exp. no no no no yes [12] yes [12]
non aff. & non exp. no no no no no [11] no [11]
Our results are summarized in Table 1. All proofs missing in this extended abstract as well as some
examples are presented in the Appendix.
Main Ideas and Outline. After introducing the basic model in Section 2, we prove the ”only if” direction
of our first result (Theorem 4.4) in Section 3. In the proof, we first establish a connection between weighted
congestion games and congestion game with variable demands. Given a weighted congestion without PNE,
we derive a congestion game with variable demands using the same cost functions that also has no PNE.
The proof idea relies on a careful design of feasible (concave and differentiable) utility functions which
preserve the improvement cycles of the original weighted congestion game. Thus, we can use an earlier
result of [11] stating that a set of cost functions is consistent for weighted congestion games if and only if this
set contains either affine functions or certain exponential functions. The hard part of completing the ”only
if” direction lies in excluding inhomogeneously exponential cost functions. We prove that these functions
are not consistent by studying a class of congestion games with fixed resource dependent demands. We
identify a subclass of these games with inhomogeneously exponential cost functions for which we construct
a congestion game with variable demands. We show that the thus constructed game fulfills the invariant of
preserved improvement cycles with respect to the original game. While this part of the proof is perhaps the
most technical, we obtain as a side-product of our analysis a novel characterization of the existence of PNE
for congestion games with resource dependent demands showing that only affine functions are consistent.
In Section 4, the ”if” part is proven. We introduce a novel potential function concept that we term
essential generalized ordinal potentials. The idea is to require that there is a real-valued function that must
increase only for a subset of improving moves. We further introduce local essential potentials, where this
property must hold only for a global maximum of the potential. For games with homogeneously exponential
cost functions, we derive a local essential potential completing the ”if” direction (games with affine costs
are exact potential games). In Section 5, we investigate a class of games that we term uniform congestion
games with variable demands. We give similar characterizations of consistency of cost functions, yielding
that only homogeneously exponential cost functions are consistent. We prove the ”if” direction by deriving
an essential potential. We conclude the paper in Section 6 by presenting new research directions.
2 Preliminaries
Congestion games with variable demands are strategic games G = (N, ¯X, (πi)i∈N), where N = {1, . . . , n} is
the non-empty and finite set of players, ¯X =

i∈N ¯Xi is the non-empty set of states or strategy profiles,
and πi : ¯X → N is the individual payoff function that specifies the payoff value of player i for each state
x¯ ∈ ¯X. We define strategies and payoff functions using the general notion of a congestion model. A tuple
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M = (N,R, X, (cr)r∈R) is called a congestion model if N is a set of players, R is a finite set of resources, and
X =

i∈N Xi is the set of configurations. For each player i ∈ N, the set Xi ⊆ 2R is a finite collection of
subsets of R. Every resource r ∈ R is endowed with a cost function cr : R≥0 → R≥0. In a congestion game
with variable demands, every player i ∈ N is allowed to choose a configuration xi ∈ Xi and a non-negative
demand di ∈ R≥0 that she places on all resources in xi. The incentive to use higher demands is stimulated
by a utility function Ui : R≥0 → R≥0 that measures the benefit that player i receives from choosing a certain
demand. Note that this benefit is independent of the resources chosen and depends solely on the chosen
demand.
Let M = (N,R, X, (cr)r∈R) be a congestion model and let (Ui)i∈N be a collection of utility functions.
We define a congestion game with variable demands and proportional costs as the game G(M) = (N, ¯X, π),
where ¯X = (X,R≥0), π = (πi)i∈N and πi(x, d) = Ui(di)−∑r∈xi dicr(ℓr(x, d)), and ℓr((x, d)) = ∑ j∈N:r∈x j d j. We
call ℓr
(
x, d) the load on resource r under strategy (x, d). Note that these games are maximization games. A
configuration x ∈ X together with a demand profile d ∈ Rn
≥0 forms a strategy profile x¯ = (x, d). Note that
proportional costs have been used before in [10] for the case of weighted congestion games.
We use standard game theory notation; for a set S ⊆ N we denote by −S its complement and by
¯XS =

i∈S ¯Xi we denote the set of strategy profiles of players in S . Instead of ¯X−{i} we will write ¯X−i, and
with a slight abuse of notation we will sometimes write a strategy profile as x¯ = (x¯i, x¯−i) meaning that x¯i ∈ ¯Xi
and x¯−i ∈ ¯X−i.
For a constant α ≥ 0, a pair
(
x¯, (y¯i, x¯−i)) ∈ ¯X × ¯X is called an α-improving move of player i if πi(x¯)+ α <
πi(y¯i, x¯−i). We denote by Iα(i) the set of α-improving moves of player i ∈ N, and we set Iα = ⋃i∈N Iα(i).
We call a sequence of strategy profiles γ = (x0, x1, . . . ) an α-improvement path if every tuple (xk, xk+1) ∈ Iα.
A strategy profile x¯ ∈ ¯X is a pure Nash equilibrium, or PNE for short, if (x¯, y¯) < I0 for all y¯ ∈ ¯X. G has
the α-finite improvement property (α-FIP) if every α-improvement path is finite. Let C be a class of cost
functions. We call C consistent w.r.t. congestion games with variable demands (or simply consistent) if
every congestion game with variable demands and cost functions in C admits a PNE. C is FIP consistent if
every congestion game with variable demands and cost functions in C has the α-FIP.
The following two assumptions contain mild restrictions on feasible utility functions and cost functions
and are standard in the literature, see [13, 17, 29].
Assumption 2.1. For every resource r ∈ R the cost function cr : R≥0 → R≥0 is twice continuously differen-
tiable and strictly increasing.
We denote by C2(R≥0) the set of functions satisfying Assumption 2.1.
Assumption 2.2. For every player i ∈ N the utility function Ui : R≥0 → R≥0 is differentiable, non-
decreasing and concave.
Remark 2.3. In contrast to most of the works in the area of Cournot games or congestion games with
splittable demands (e.g.,[13, 17, 23]), we do not assume semi-convexity of cost functions.
3 Necessary Conditions
At first we present some simple but useful observations. It is easy to see that consistent cost functions cannot
have bounded marginal costs. Formally, if C is consistent, then c(x) + xc′(x) → ∞ as x → ∞ for all c ∈ C.
To see this, assume that there is c ∈ C with c(x) + xc′(x) < M for some M ∈ R>0. Consider a game with one
resource and cost function c and one player with utility function U(x) = (M + 1) x. The payoff of the player
increases with the demand, thus, this game does not admit a PNE.
Moreover, the following lemma will be useful throughout this paper. It simply uses the first-order
optimality condition of a PNE.
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Lemma 3.1. In any PNE (x∗, d∗) of a congestion game with variable demands U′i (d∗i ) =
∂ d∗i
∑
r∈xi cr(ℓr(x∗ ,d∗))
∂d∗ifor all i ∈ N with d∗i > 0, and U′i (d∗i ) ≤
∂ d∗i
∑
r∈xi cr(ℓr(x∗ ,d∗))
∂d∗i
for all i ∈ N with d∗i = 0.
Necessity of Affine or Exponential Costs. First, we establish a connection between congestion games
with variable demands and weighted congestion games. We will exploit this connection to show that con-
sistent cost functions for congestion games with variable demands must be either affine or exponential.
Let M = (N,R, X, (cr)r∈R) be a congestion model and (dwi )i∈N be a vector of demands with dwi ∈ R>0.
The corresponding weighted congestion game is the strategic game Gw(M) = (N, X, π), where π is de-
fined as π =

i∈N πi, πi(x) =
∑
r∈xi dwi cr
(
ℓr(x)) and ℓr(x) = ∑ j∈N:r∈x j dwj . Note that these games are cost
minimization games. We will show that whenever there is a weighted congestion game Gw(M) that does
not admit a PNE, then there is also a congestion game with variable demands G(M) under the same con-
gestion model without a PNE. The proof of this result is constructive, i.e., given the weighted congestion
game Gw(M) and the corresponding vector of demands dwi , we construct a congestion game with variable
demands not possessing a PNE.
Note that the main difficulty lies in the fact that in congestion games with variable demands the strategy
space is strictly larger than in weighted congestion games. We overcome this issue by designing for every
player i a utility function Ui that allows us to restrict a priori the set of equilibrium demands of player
i to a small environment (ti − σ, ti + σ) around a target demand ti. To this end, recall that Lemma 3.1
establishes that in every PNE player i’s marginal utility equals her marginal cost given that her demand is
strictly positive. Our basic idea is to define the utility function Ui of player i such that the following two
properties are guaranteed: (i) player i always has an interest to play a positive demand; (ii) for every possible
value C′ of player i’s marginal costs, the equation U′i (di) = C′ is met only for di ∈ (ti − σ, ti + σ). As we
will see, we can find smoothed 2-wise linear utility functions that suit our purposes.
We define the piecewise linear function through the sequence of points ((τ0, υ0), (τ1, υ1), . . . , (τk, υk)) as
the function
g
((τ0, υ0), . . . , (τk, υk)) (x) =

υi +
υi−υi−1
τi−τi−1
(x − τi), if x ∈ [τi, τi+1) for some i ∈ {0, k − 1},
υk, if x ∈ [τk,+∞).
(1)
Since we are interested in obtaining non-decreasing and concave functions we will assume in the following
that the sequence of slopes
(
υi−υi−1
τi−τi−1
)
i=1,...,k
is positive and non-increasing. To obtain differentiable functions,
we choose a sufficiently small σ > 0 and replace the function g on every set (τi −σ, τi+σ), i = 1, . . . , k by a
non-decreasing and differentiable function such that the functional values and first derivatives in τi − σ and
τi + σ comply. For instance, we can choose a suitable quadratic function on every interval (τi − σ, τi + σ),
see the following example.
Example 1. Let g((τ1 ,υ1),...,(τk,υk)) be a non-decreasing and concave piecewise linear function and let 0 < σ <
(mini=1,...,k τi − τi−1) / 2 be a smoothening parameter. We regard the function gσ((τ1 ,υ1),...,(τk,υk)) : R≥0 → R≥0
defined as
gσ((τ1 ,υ1),...,(τk,υk)) (x) =

1
4σ (si − si−1)
(
x − τi + σ
si+si−1
si−si−1
)2
+υi+σsi−
σs2i
si−si−1
, if x∈ (τi−σ, τi+σ), i=1, . . . , k
g((τ1 ,υ1),...,(τk,υk)) (x), else.
Remark that the quadratic functions on (τi − σ, τi + σ), i = 1, . . . , k are chosen such that the smoothed
piecewise linear function gσ((τ1 ,υ1),...,(τk ,υk)) is continuously differentiable. Two such functions are shown in
Figure 1.
We denote the corresponding smoothed piecewise linear function by gσ((τ0, υ0), . . . , (τk, υk)). By de-
signing special smoothed 2-wise linear functions, we obtain the following lemma.
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Figure 1: Plot of the smoothed 3-wise linear function g1
((0, 0)(3, 15)(7, 19))) and of the smoothed 2-wise linear function
g1
((0, 0)(5, 20)).
Lemma 3.2. Let M be a congestion model, (ti)i∈N ∈ Rn>0 a vector of target demands with tmin =mini∈N{ti}
and tmax = maxi∈N{ti}. Moreover, let M > max
{2∑r∈R cr(T )
tmin
,
∑
r∈R
(
cr(T ) + (tmax + σ) maxℓ∈[tmin,T ] c′r(ℓ)
)}
,
where T = ∑ j∈N(t j +σ) and σ < tmin / 2. Let G be the congestion game with variable demands and utilities
Ui = gσ((0,0), (ti ,Mti)) for all i∈N. Then, d∗i ∈ (ti−σ, ti+σ) for all i ∈ N and every PNE (x∗, d∗) of G.
Proof. For contradiction, suppose there is a PNE x¯∗ = (x∗, d∗) of G and i ∈ N with d∗i < (ti − σ, ti + σ).
First, assume d∗i > ti + σ. As cr is strictly increasing, we may assume without loss of generality that there
is r ∈ xi with cr(d∗i ) > 0. Lemma 3.1 implies 0 = U′i (d∗i ) =
∑
r∈x∗i
(
cr(ℓr(x¯∗)) + d∗i c′r(ℓr(x¯∗)
)
> 0, which is a
contradiction.
Now, suppose d∗i = 0 and thus πi(x∗, d∗) = 0. We denote by y¯ = (x∗i , ti − σ, x∗−i, d∗−i) the strategy profile
in which player i chooses her demand equal to ti − σ instead. Note that πi(y¯) = M(ti − σ) −∑r∈x∗i cr(ℓr(y¯)).
Using that in equilibrium d∗i < ti + σ, we obtain πi(y¯) ≥ M(ti − σ) −
∑
r∈R cr(T ), which is positive, because
M > 2
∑
r∈R cr(T ) / tmin >
∑
r∈R cr(T ) / (ti − σ). This is a contradiction to the assumption that d∗i = 0.
Finally, let us assume that 0 < d∗i < ti − σ. Referring to Lemma 3.1, we obtain the equality U′i (d∗i ) =
∂ (d∗i
∑
r∈xi cr(ℓ(x¯∗))) / ∂d∗i . In particular,
M =
∑
r∈xi
(
cr(ℓ(x¯∗)) + d∗i c′r(ℓ(x¯∗))
)
≤
∑
r∈R
(
cr(T ) + (ti + σ) max
ℓ∈[tmin,T ]
c′r(ℓ)
)
,
which contradicts M >
∑
r∈R
(
cr(T ) + (ti + σ) maxℓ∈[tmin,T ] c′r(ℓ)
)
. 
We are now ready to state our first main theorem.
Proposition 3.3. Let M be a congestion model and let Gw = (N, X, πw) be a corresponding weighted
congestion game with the vector of demands (dwi )i∈N . If Gw does not admit a PNE, then there exists a
congestion game with variable demands G(M) to the same congestion model, that does not admit a PNE.
Proof. Let σ < mini∈N(dwi ), M > 1 and let G(M)M,σ = GM,σ be a parameterized congestion game (the
parameters are M, σ) with variable demands and utility functions UM,σi = gσ
((0, 0), (dwi , Mdwi )). We claim
that for sufficiently small σ and sufficiently large M, there is a game G(M)M,σ that does not admit a PNE.
First note that the set X of strategy profiles in Gw equals the set of configuration profiles in GM,σ. Since
Gw does not admit a PNE, we can find for every strategy profile x ∈ X a player i(x) ∈ N and y(x) ∈ X such
that πwi(x)(x) > πwi(x)(y(x)) and y(x) = (yi(x), x−i). Note that weighted congestion games are minimization
games and, thus, player i(x) improves her cost when switching from strategy xi to yi(x). Because the set X
of strategy profiles of Gw is finite, we obtain δ = minx∈X
(
πi(x)(x) − πi(x)(y(x))) > 0.
For a contradiction, assume that there is a PNE (x∗, d∗) of GM,σ. Assuming that M is sufficiently large
and referring to Lemma 3.2, we obtain d∗i ∈ (dwi − σ, dwi + σ) as a necessary condition. Recall that in
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the weighted congestion game Gw, the deviation from x∗ to y(x∗) is profitable for player i(x∗). Writing i
shorthand for i(x∗), we obtain
πwi
(
y(x∗)) − πwi (x∗) =
∑
r∈x∗i
cr(ℓr(x∗) −
∑
r∈yi(x∗)
cr(ℓr(y(x∗)) =
∑
r∈x∗i
cr
( ∑
j∈N:r∈x∗j
dwj
)
−
∑
r∈yi(x∗)
cr
( ∑
j∈N:r∈y(x∗) j
dwj
)
> δ.
Said differently, the function h : Rn
≥0 → R, d 7→
∑
r∈x∗i
cr
(∑
j∈N:r∈x∗j d j
)
−
∑
r∈yi(x∗) cr
(∑
j∈N:r∈y(x∗) j d j
)
is
positive for dw. Note that h is continuous in every component implying that there is ǫ > 0 such that
h(d) = ∑r∈x∗i cr
(∑
j∈N:r∈x∗j d j
)
−
∑
r∈yi(x∗) cr
(∑
j∈N:r∈y(x∗) j d j
)
> 0 for all d ∈ Rn
≥0 with |di − d
w
i | < ǫ. We
set σ = ǫ and regard again the game GM,σ for which πi
(
y(x∗), d∗) − πi(x∗, d∗) = ∑r∈x∗i cr(ℓr(x∗, d∗)) −∑
r∈yi(x∗) cr(ℓr(y(x), d∗) > 0, since d∗i ∈ (dwi − ǫ, dwi + ǫ). We conclude that player i deviates profitably from
(x∗, d∗) to (y(x∗), d∗). 
In [11] it is shown that for weighted congestion games, a set C of (twice continuously differentiable) cost
functions is consistent if and only if one of the following cases holds: (i) C contains only affine functions;
(ii) C contains only exponential functions of type c(ℓ) = ac eφℓ + bc for some constants ac.bc, φ ∈ R where
ac and bc may depend on c while φ is a common constant for all c ∈ C. By Proposition 3.3, we obtain the
following result as an immediate corollary.
Corollary 3.4. If C ⊆ C2(R≥0) is consistent w.r.t. congestion game with variable demands then one of the
following cases holds: (i) C contains only affine functions; (ii) C contains only exponential functions.
The upper result even holds when regarding only network congestion games with variable demands, see
the discussion in [11]. Because we only need to consider non-negative and strictly increasing cost functions
with unbounded marginal costs, for an affine cost function c, we can assume that c(ℓ) = a ℓ + b with a > 0,
b ≥ 0. For an exponential function c(ℓ) = a eφℓ + b we can assume a, φ > 0 and b ≥ −a. The function c is
called homogeneously exponential if b = 0 and inhomogeneously exponential otherwise. Moreover, when
we say that a set C of functions contains only exponential functions, we assume that there is a universal
constant φ > 0 such that every c ∈ C can be written as c(ℓ) = ac eφℓ+bc for some constants ac > 0, bc ≥ −ac.
Excluding Inhomogeneously Exponential Costs. Next, we show that any inhomogenously exponential
function c(ℓ) = a eφℓ + b with a, φ > 0 and b , 0 is not consistent w.r.t. congestion games with variable
demands. In particular, for every such function c there is a congestion game with variable demands and
cost equal to c on all resources that does not admit a PNE. In order to prove this result, we first investigate
congestion games with resource dependent demands. A complete characterization of the set of cost functions
that is consistent w.r.t. this class of games is given. We will use a further refinement of this characterization
to show that inhomogenously exponential function are not consistent w.r.t. congestion games with variable
demands. Let us first define congestion games with resource dependent demands.
Definition 3.5. LetM = (N, F, X, (cr)r∈R) be a congestion model and let (di,r)i∈N,r∈R be a matrix of demands.
The corresponding congestion game with resource dependent demands is the game G(M) = (N, X, π),
where π is defined as π =i∈N πi, πi(x) =
∑
r∈xi di,r cr
(
ℓr(x)) and ℓr(x) = ∑ j∈N:r∈x j d j,r .
Restricting the strategy sets to singletons, we obtain scheduling games on unrelated machines as a special
case. Harks et al. [12] showed that congestion games with resource dependent and affine costs always admit
a PNE. Here, we strengthen their result providing a complete characterization of cost functions that are
consistent w.r.t. congestion games with resource dependent demand.
Theorem 3.6. A set C ⊆ C2(R≥0) of cost functions is consistent w.r.t. congestion games with resource
dependent demands if and only if C contains only affine functions.
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Figure 2: Strategy spaces of the three players in the game considered in the proof of Theorem 3.6. Players 1 and 2 have two
strategies each, which are drawn as solid boxes. Player 3 has a single strategy which is shown as a dashed box.
Proof. Since congestion games with resource dependent demands contain weighted congestion games by
setting di,r = di,r′ for all i ∈ N and r, r′ ∈ R, we know that any set of consistent cost functions C contains
either only affine functions or only exponential functions. So it is left to show that for every exponential
cost function c(ℓ) = a eφℓ + b with a, φ > 0 and b ≥ −a, there is a congestion game with resource-dependent
demands that does not possess a PNE.
To this end, let c(ℓ) = a eφℓ + b with a, φ ∈ R>0 and b ≥ −a be given and consider the congestion model
M = (N,R, X, (cr)r∈R) with three players N = {1, 2, 3} and 28 resources R = {r1, . . . , r28}. The strategy
spaces of player 1 and 2 contain two strategies only, that is, X1 = {x1, xˆ1} and X2 = {x2, xˆ2}. We define
x1 = {r1, . . . , r8}, xˆ1 = {r9, r10, r11, r12}, x2 = {r1, . . . , r7, r9, r13, . . . , r22}, xˆ2 = {r8, r10, r11, r23, . . . , r28}.
Player 3 has only a single strategy x3 = {r8, r13, . . . , r22}. The strategy spaces are shown in Figure 2.
Note that the two strategies of the non-trivial players i ∈ {1, 2} are disjoint. The resource-dependent
demands of these players are given by di,r = ln 2 / φ for all resources r ∈ xi and di,r = 2 ln 2 / φ for all
resources r ∈ xˆi. The demand of player 3 equals d3,r = 3 / φ for all r ∈ R. We calculate that
π1(xˆ1, x2, x3) − π1(x1, x2, x3) = 2 ln 2
φ
(
22a + b + 2(22a + b) + 22a + b
)
−
ln 2
φ
(
7(22a + b) + 8(24a + b
)
= −124 a
ln 2
φ
< 0.
Similarly, we obtain
π2(xˆ1, xˆ2, x3) − π2(xˆ1, x2, x3) = −6 a ln 2
φ
< 0, π1(x1, xˆ2, x3) − π(xˆ1, xˆ2, x3) = −2 a ln 2
φ
< 0,
π2(x1, x2, x3) − π2(x1, xˆ2, x3) = −2 a ln 2
φ
.
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Since the game that we constructed in this proof contains only 4 strategy profiles and each profile admits a
profitable deviation, we conclude that the game does not admit a PNE. 
Let us call a congestion game with resource dependent demands simple if each player has a unique de-
mand per strategy, that is, for all i ∈ N and xi ∈ Xi there is dxi ∈ R>0 such that di,r = dxi for all r ∈ xi.
Since the game constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.6 is simple, the statement of Theorem 3.6 is also valid
for simple congestion games with resource dependent demands. In particular, for every non-affine function,
there is a congestion model M = (N,R, X, (cr)r∈R) and a corresponding simple congestion game with re-
source dependent demands Grd = Grd(M) with costs equal to c on all resources that has an improvement
cycle (x1, x2, . . . , xs, x1). Now consider a congestion game with variable demands G = G(M) to the same
model, where the utility of each player is constant. Clearly, the cycle ((x1, d1), (x2, d2), . . . , (xs, ds), (x1, d1)),
where dki equals the fixed demand of player i in the congestion game with resource dependent demand is
also an improvement cycle for G. We have established the following.
Proposition 3.7. For a set C ⊆ C2(R≥0) the following three are equivalent: (i) C contains only affine
functions; (ii) C is FIP consistent w.r.t. congestion games with variable demands; (iii) C is consistent w.r.t.
congestion games with resource dependent demands.
Note that for any non-affine cost function c, there is a congestion game with variable demands and costs
equal to c with an improvement cycle. However, there might be PNE outside that cycle.
Our basic idea for a complete characterization is the following. Let c be an arbitrary exponential func-
tion. Using Theorem 3.6, there is a simple congestion game with resource dependent demands Grd that does
not admit a PNE. We want to construct a congestion game with variable demands G where players’ have
access on the same resources. We design the players’ concave and non-decreasing utility functions such that
for any PNE (xi, x∗−i, d∗i , d∗−i) in which player i plays configuration xi, the equilibrium demand d∗i is close to
dxi . The key to make this idea work is to introduce additional resources so as to ensure that the players’
marginal costs enforce these equilibrium demands. As it turns out, this manipulation can only be done for
the case of inhomogenously exponential cost functions. To illustrate this idea, we give an example. If we
add two resources with cost c(ℓ) = ex + 1 to a players’ strategy who plays a demand equal to 1, her costs are
increased by 2e + 2 while her marginal costs are increased by 4e + 2. If we instead add one resource with
the same cost and a trivial player who plays a demand equal to ln(2 + e−1), then her costs are increased by
2e + 2 as well, but her marginal costs are increased by 4e + 3. In this fashion, we can increase the marginal
costs of one configurations more than in some other configuration while leaving their differences in costs
constant. Since increasing the marginal cost of a configuration, decreases the equilibrium demand, the key
challenge is to manipulate the players’ marginal costs in order to enforce them play the right equilibrium
demands. Before we will develop this idea in the proof of Proposition 3.9, we need the following technical
lemma which is a strengthening of Theorem 3.6.
Lemma 3.8. Let ∆ > 0 be arbitrary. Theorem 3.6 holds even for simple congestion games with resource
dependent demands, where for each player one of the following holds: (i) Player i has exactly one strategy,
that is, Xi = {xi} with xi ⊆ R; (ii) Player i has exactly two strategies that she uses with demands that differ
by ∆, that is, Xi = {xi, xˆ} and |dxi − dxˆi | = ∆ with xi, xˆi ⊆ R.
Proof. To obtain this more general result, we need a more involved construction compared to that of the
proof of Theorem 3.6. Let c(ℓ) = a eφℓ + b with a, φ ∈ R>0 and b ≥ −a and consider for p, q ∈ N>0 the
congestion model M = (N,R, X, (cr)r∈R) with 5 players and 6q + p resources
R = {r1, . . . , rp, s1, . . . , s2q, v1, . . . , v2q,w1, . . . ,w2q}.
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Only the first two players i ∈ {1, 2} have two strategies and will be called non-trivial players. Their strategy
spaces are given by
X1 = {x1, xˆ1}, where x1 = {r1, . . . , rp, s1, . . . , s2q}, xˆ1 = {v1, . . . , v2q},
X2 = {x2, xˆ2}, where x2 = {r1, . . . , rp,w1, . . . ,w2q}, xˆ2 = {s1, . . . , s2q}.
The players 3, 4, and 5 have only one strategy and serve only to increase the costs on some of the resources.
They will be called trivial players. Their strategies are given by X3 =
{
x3
}
=
{
{r1, . . . , rp}
}
, X4 =
{
x4
}
={
s1, . . . , s2q}, X5 =
{
x5
}
=
{
{v1, . . . , v2q}
}
. The strategy spaces are shown in Figure 3 (a). Observe that the
strategies of the two non-trivial players are disjoint. For the non-trivial players i ∈ {1, 2}, we set di,r = 2 ln 2φ
for all r ∈ xi and di,r = (2 + pq ) ln2φ for all r ∈ xˆi.
Assume that the demand of the non-trivial players 3, 4, and 5 are given by d3,r = ln(a3) / φ, d4,r =
ln(a4) / φ, and d5,r = ln(a5) / φ for all r ∈ R, where a3, a4, a5 > 1 are parameters. We will carefully choose
the parameters a3, a4, and a5 such that
γ =
((x1, x2, x3, x4, x5), (xˆ1, x2, x3, x4, x5), (xˆ1, xˆ2, x3, x4, x5), (x1, xˆ2, x3, x4, x5), (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5))
is an improvement cycle. Calculating the costs of the respective deviating non-trivial player in γ, we obtain
the following necessary and sufficient conditions
25 p a3 + 24 q a4 > (2 + p/q) 23+p/q q a5 (G1)
23 p a3 + 24 q > (2 + p/q) 23+p/q q a4 (G2)
(2 + p/q) 23+p/q q a5 > 23 p a3 + 26+p/q q a4 (G3)
(2 + p/q) 25+p/q q a4 > 25 p a3 + 24 q. (G4)
First, note that the right hand side of inequality (G1) and the left hand side of inequality (G3) are equal. This
is due to the fact that the second strategy of the first player can be seen as an outside option of player 1 since
none of the resources in that strategy is contained in one of the strategies of the other non-trivial player 2.
Thus it is sufficient to consider the inequality
25 p a3 + 24 q a4 > 23 p a3 + 26+p/q q a4
⇔ p a3 >
8
3
2p/q q a4 −
2
3
q a4 (G1’)
instead of (G1) and (G3). Once this conditions is satisfied one can choose a5 appropriately. Inequalities
(G2) and (G4) give rise to
p a3 > 2p/q(2q + p) a4 − 2 q, (G2’)
2p/q(2q + p) a4 − q/2 > p a3, (G4’)
respectively. It is left to show that inequalities (G1’), (G2’), and (G4’) can be satisfied simultaneously. To
this end, observe that the function f (x) = 2x(x − 23 ) + 23 is strictly increasing for x ≥ 0. As f (0) = 0, the
function f is strictly positive for every x > 0. This implies that the inequality 2p/q( pq − 23 ) + 23 > 0 holds for
all p, q ∈ N>0
We define a4 > max {1, 1 /
(
2p/q( pq − 23 ) + 23
}
and a3 = 2p/q(2q/p + 1) a4 − qp . Since q > 0, clearly a3
and a4 satisfy (G2’) and (G4’). As for (G1’), note that
p a3 −
8
3 2
p/q q a4 +
2
3 q a4 = a4
(
2
3 q −
2
32
p/q p − 2p/q p
)
− q > 0.
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We set a5 = 12(2+p/q)23+p/qq (25 pa3 + 24qa4 − 23 pa3 − 26+p/qqa4) = 1(2+p/q)23+p/qq (12pa3 + (23 − 25+p/q)qa4).
Clearly, a5 satisfies (G1) and (G3). It is left to show, that a3, a4, and a5 are not smaller than 1. Since a4 > 1
by definition, (G1’) implies a3 > qp (832p/q − 23 ) > 1. As for a5, inequality (G3) gives rise to
a5 >
p a3
(2 + pq ) q 2p/q
+
8 a4
(2 + pq ) q
= a4 −
q
(2 + pq ) q 2p/q
+
8 a4
(2 + pq ) q
> 1 +
23+p/q q − 1
(2 + pq ) 2p/q
> 1
Thus, we have found a3, a4, a5 > 1 such that γ is an improvement cycle, establishing that the corre-
sponding game does not admit a PNE. 
We are now ready for the main result of this section.
Proposition 3.9. Any inhomogenously exponential function is not consistent w.r.t. congestion games with
variable demands.
Proof. Let c(ℓ) = a eφℓ + b with a, φ > 0 and b ≥ −a, b , 0 be an inhomogeneously exponential function.
We first assume that φ = 1 and b > 0. In the concluding remarks of this proof, we sketch how the arguments
can be adapted to work with arbitrary φ > 0 and −a ≤ b < 0.
As shown in Lemma 3.8, for every p, q ∈ N>0 there is a congestion model M = (N,R, X, (cr)r∈R) with
p + 6q resources, 5 players and cost functions cr = c for all r ∈ R such that there is a corresponding
congestion game with resource dependent demands Grd = (N, X, πrd) that does not admit a PNE. The game
Grd can be constructed to have the following additional properties: The set of players Nrd is partitioned into
two non-trivial players Nnt and three trivial players Nt. Every trivial player i ∈ Nt has a unique strategy
Xi = {xi} and a unique demand ti = di,r for all r ∈ R. Every non-trivial player i ∈ Nnt has exactly two disjoint
strategies Xi = {xi, xˆi} and exactly two demands ti = 2 and tˆi = 2 + p/q, such that di,r = ti for all r ∈ xi
and di,r = tˆi for all r ∈ xˆi. For notational convenience, we use the convention ti = tˆi for every trivial player
i ∈ Nrdt .
Based on the game Grd described above, we want to construct a congestion game with variable demands
G that does not admit a PNE. Our construction is based on carefully designing the players’ utility function.
In fact, the players’ utilities should offer them an incentive to play (almost) the same demands as in the
congestion game with resource dependent demands. That is, we want to assure that in any PNE of G (if it
exists) if player i uses the configuration xi, then her demand is close to ti. In contrast, if player i plays xˆi,
then her demand is close to tˆi.
As shown in Lemma 3.2, if Mi is sufficiently large and the utility of the trivial player i ∈ Nt is given by
the smoothed 2-wise linear function Ui = gσ
((0, 0), (ti, Miti)), then d∗i ∈ (ti −σ, ti +σ) in every PNE (x∗, d∗)
of G.
For the non-trivial players, we will use a similar idea. We define their utilities such that d∗i ∈ (ti−σ, ti+σ)
for every PNE
((xi, x∗−i), d∗) in which player i plays her first configuration xi and d∗i ∈ (tˆi−σ, tˆi+σ) for every
PNE
((xˆi, x∗−i), d∗) in which player i plays her second configuration xˆi. We note the subtle disambiguation
between strategies in congestion games (with resources-dependent demands) and strategies in congestion
games with variable demands. While a strategy in a congestion game is a subset of resources, a strategy in
a congestion game with variable demands is a tuple of a subset of resources and a demand. To distinguish
between both, we call the sets xi ∈ Xi ⊆ 2R strategies when speaking of the congestion game with resource
dependent demand and configurations when dealing with the congestion game with variable demand.
To enforce the right demands in the congestion game with variable demands, we will enhance the un-
derlying congestion model. We introduce new resources (parameterized by m, mˆ) and additional players in
Step 2. In Step 3, we will choose the parameters p, q,m, mˆ ∈ N>0 and some ǫ > 0. The utility functions
of the non-trivial players will be defined in Step 4. Finally, in Step 5 we show that the thus constructed
congestion game with variable demand does not admit a PNE.
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(a) Non-network congestion game
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(b) Network congestion game
Figure 3: Strategy spaces of the of the congestion games constructed in the proof of Lemma 3.9 in their non-network and network
representations. In the non-network representation (a) the non-trivial players 1 and 2 each have two strategies shown by boxes with
solid lines while the trivial players 3, 4 and 5 each have a single strategy drawn as dashed boxes. Omitting the dashed resources as
well as the new trivial players 6 and 7 one obtains the congestion model constructed in Lemma 3.8 on which the proof of Lemma 3.9
is based. In the network representation (b) resources correspond to the edges of the graph. Each player i is associated with a pair
(si, ti) of nodes. The set of strategies of each player equals the set of her directed (si, ti)-paths. By adding sufficiently many resources
to the path that is indicated by the dashed line, the set of every players undominated non of the non-trivial players will use this path
in equilibrium.
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Step 2: Enhancing the congestion model. For every non-trivial player i ∈ Nnt we add m ∈ N new
resources to i’s first strategy xi and mˆ ∈ N resources to i’s second strategy xˆi. In addition, the 2m new
resources added to x1 and x2, respectively, shall be used by two new trivial players. Technically, we introduce
a new congestion model M′ = (N′,R′, X′, (cr)r∈R′). The new set of players contains two new trivial players.
Thus, we define N′t = Nt ∪ {6, 7}, N′nt = Nnt, and N′ = N′nt ∪ N′t . For every non-trivial player i ∈ N′nt, we set
x′i = xi∪ {r
i
1, . . . , r
i
m} and xˆ′i = xˆi∪ {rˆ
i
1, . . . , rˆ
i
mˆ
}. Note that the new set of resources contains p+ 6q+ 2m+ 2mˆ
resources, so
R′ = {r1, . . . , rp, s1, . . . , s2q, v1, . . . , vsq,w1, . . . ,w2q, r11, . . . , r
1
m, rˆ
1
1, . . . , rˆ
1
mˆ, r
2
1, . . . , r
2
m, rˆ
2
1, . . . , rˆ
2
mˆ}.
The (old) trivial players 3, 4, and 5, have the same strategies as in Grd. The new trivial player 6 has a
single strategy x′6 = {r
1
1, . . . , r
1
m}, the single strategy of player 7 is x′7 = {r
2
1, . . . , r
2
m}. For some ǫ > 0 to
be defined later, we want these two players to play a demand close to t6 = t7 = p/q + ln(3+ǫ+p/q3 ) + ln( mˆm )
in equilibrium. As we already argued for the other trivial players 3, 4, and 5 choosing the right smoothed
2-wise linear function for players 6 and 7 their equilibrium demands can be restricted to d∗6 ∈ (t6 −σ, t6 +σ)
and d∗7 ∈ (t7 − σ, t7 + σ), respectively.
Observe that the marginal utility of each player i ∈ N′ is zero for demands di ≥ tˆi + 1/2. Hence, in any
PNE (x′∗, d∗), every player i ∈ N′ will use a demand d∗i < tˆi + 1/2. Let us now consider a non-trivial player
j ∈ N′nt. We observe that j’s marginal cost MC j(x′j, x∗− j, t j, d∗− j) = ∂ t j
∑
r∈x j cr
(
ℓr(x′j, x∗− j, t j, d∗− j)
)
/ ∂t j when
playing her first configuration x′j and her first target demand t j = 2 can be bounded from below by
MC j(x′j, x′∗− j, t j, d∗− j) = 3
∑
r∈x j
a e
ℓr(x′j ,x′∗− j ,t j,d∗− j) +
∣∣∣x j∣∣∣ b + a mˆ
(
3 + ǫ + p
q
)
e2+p/q + m b
> a
(
3 + p
q
)
mˆ e2+p/q + a mˆ ǫ e2+p/q + m b. (2)
for all x′∗
− j ∈ X
′
− j and d
∗
− j ∈

i, j[0, tˆi + 1/2]. Note that the summation is over r ∈ xi, that is, we do not sum
over the m newly introduced resources. Assuming that no player uses a non-optimal demand (which gives a
marginal utility equal to zero) and that σ ≤ 1, player j’s marginal costs when playing her first strategy and
her first target demand can also be bounded from above by
MC j(x′j, x′∗− j, t j, d∗− j) ≤ ω j + a mˆ
(
3 + ǫ + p
q
)
e2+p/q + m b, (3)
where ω j = 3
∑
r∈R a e
4+2p/q+
∑
j=3,...,7 t j+7 +
∣∣∣R| b. Analogously, in every equilibrium j’s marginal cost when
playing her second configuration xˆ′j and her second target demand tˆ j = 2 + p/q can be bounded from above
by
MC j(xˆ′j, x′∗− j, tˆ j, d∗− j) =
(
3 + p
q
)∑
r∈xˆ j
a e
ℓr(xˆ j ,x′∗− j ,tˆ j,d∗− j) +
∣∣∣xˆ j∣∣∣ b +
(
3 + p
q
)
a mˆ e2+p/q + mˆ b
< ω j + a
(
3 + p
q
)
mˆ e2+p/q + mˆ b. (4)
for all x′∗
− j ∈ X
′
− j and d∗− j ∈

i, j[0, tˆi + 1/2].
So j’s marginal cost when playing her first configuration x′j with low demand t j = 2 can be bounded from
below by B = amˆ(3+ pq )e2+p/q+amˆǫ e2+p/q+bm and her marginal cost when playing her second configuration
xˆ′j with high demand tˆ j = 2+p/q can be bounded form above by ˆB = ω j+a mˆ (3+p/q)e2+p/q+mˆ b. Moreover,
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note that j’s actual cost when playing her first configuration x′j with low demand t j has been increased by
2
3 (3 + ǫ + p/q) a mˆ e2+p/q + 2 b m by adding m additional resources. In contrast, the cost when playing her
second configuration xˆ′j with high demand tˆ j has been increased by (2 + p/q) a mˆ e2+p/q + (2 + p/q) bmˆ. We
want that the slope τ j of player j’s utility between t j and tˆ j is such that B > τ j > ˆB in order to give player j
the incentive to play x′j only together with demand t j and xˆ
′
j only together with demand tˆ j, respectively.
As we want to cancel out the difference in utility U j(tˆ j)−U j(t j) ≈ pqτ j by the additional costs, we require
p
q
τ j =
(
2 + p
q
)
a mˆ e2+p/q +
(
2 + p
q
)
bmˆ − 2
3
(
3 + ǫ + p
q
)
a mˆ e2+p/q − 2 b m. (5)
We proceed showing how to choose p, q,m, mˆ and ǫ in order to satisfy B > τ j > ˆB and (5).
Step 3: Choosing the parameters p, q,m, mˆ ∈ N>0 and ǫ > 0. Introducing x = p/q, we want to solve
a mˆ (3 + x) e2+x + a mˆ ǫ e2+x − b(mˆ − m) >
(
1
3
−
2ǫ
3x
)
a mˆ e2+x +
2b
x
(mˆ − m) > a mˆ (3 + x) e2+x + ωi. (6)
Defining ǫ = 2b
a
e−2−x, m = 1 and dividing by mˆ we get
a (3 + x) e2+x + b + b
mˆ
>
2
3 b x
−1 +
1
3 a e
2+x −
2b
xmˆ
> a (3 + x) e2+x + ωi
mˆ
. (7)
The function f (x) = 23 bx−1 + 13ae2+x − a(3 + x)e2+x is continuous with respect to x. Moreover, f goes to ∞
as x → 0 and goes to −∞ as x → ∞. In Particular, there is a rational x = p/q such that b > f (x) > 0. Hence,
x solves (7) for sufficiently large mˆ.
For the sequel of this proof, let us fix p, q,m and mˆ such that they solve (6). We continue defining the
non-trivial players’ utilities.
Step 4: Defining the non-trivial players’ utilities. For every non-trivial player j ∈ N′nt we define the
utility function U j as the 3-wise linear function U j = gσ
((0, 0), (t j, M j t j), (tˆ j, M j t j + τ j (tˆ j − t j))) with
τ j = (13 − 2ǫx ) a mˆ e2+x + 2bx (mˆ − m) and M j > ω j + mˆ (3 + ǫ + p/q) e2+p/q + m b. As marginal costs and
marginal utilities coincide in any equilibrium, we obtain that d∗j ∈ (t j−σ, t j+σ) for every PNE
((x′j, x∗− j), d∗)
in which player j plays her first configuration x′j and d∗j ∈ (tˆ j − σ, tˆ j + σ) for every PNE
((xˆ′j, x∗− j), d∗) in
which player j plays her second configuration xˆ′j. We finish the proof showing that we can find a sufficiently
small σ for which no PNE of G exists.
Step 5: Choosing σ such that G does not admit a PNE. For contradiction, assume that for every σ > 0
there is a PNE x¯ = (x′∗, d∗) of G. Let us first consider the case x′∗1 = x1 and x′∗2 = x2, that is both non-trivial
players use their first strategy. As we argued in the last paragraph, we can deduce d∗i ∈ (ti − σ, ti +σ) for all
i ∈ N′ as a necessary condition on the equilibrium demand.
We claim that player 1 improves her utility when switching from x¯ = (x′1, d∗1) to y¯ = (xˆ′1, tˆ1). Note that
π1(y¯) − π1(x¯) = U1(tˆ1) −
∑
r∈xˆ1
cr(ℓr(y¯)) − a mˆ
(
2 + p
q
)
e2+p/q − b mˆ
(
2 + p
q
)
−
(
U1(d∗1) −
∑
r∈x1
cr(ℓr(x¯) − a mˆ
(
2 + 2ǫ
3
+
2p
3q
)
e2+p/q − 2 b m
)
= U1(tˆ1) − U1(d∗1) −
(
p
3q −
2ǫ
3
)
a mˆ e2+p/q − 2b(mˆ − m) − 2p
q
bmˆ +
∑
r∈x1
cr(ℓr(x¯) −
∑
r∈xˆ1
cr(ℓr(y¯))
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Since in the congestion game with resource dependent demands Grd, the deviation from (x1, x2, . . . , x5)
to (xˆ1, x2, . . . , x5) is profitable for player 1, there is δ > 0 such that the sum ∑r∈x1 cr(ℓr(x¯)−∑r∈xˆ1 cr(ℓr(y¯)) >
δ > 0. Moreover, note that player 1’s utility function is chosen such that U1(tˆ1) − U1(d∗1) goes to pq τ =
( p3q − 2ǫ3 ) a mˆ e2+x + 2b(mˆ−m)+ 2pq bmˆ as σ goes to zero. We conclude that also in the congestion game with
variable demands, player 1 deviates profitable from x¯ = (x′1, d∗1) to y¯ = (xˆ′1, tˆ1) for σ sufficiently small. This
contradicts our assumption and we derive that G does not admit a PNE.
Concluding remarks. With the above construction we have established that for every cost function c(ℓ) =
a eφℓ + b with φ = 1 and b > 0, there is a congestion game with variable demands and cost equal to c on all
resources that does not possess a PNE.
We sketch the argumentation for −a ≤ b < 0. The construction is the same except that in Step 3, we
require that mˆ < m and we set the target demands of the new trivial players to t6 = t7 = p/q+ln(3+ǫ+p/q3 ) > 0.
It is easy to verify that the inequalities (2), (3), and (4) stay valid. Then, as b < 0 and mˆ − m < 0, we can
solve inequality (6) in Step 3 with the same argument as before. Steps 4 and 5 remain as in the original
proof.
For arbitrary φ > 0, we scale the target demands ti and tˆi of every player by 1/φ. 
Remark 3.10. The above result also holds for network congestion games, see the construction in Fig-
ure 3 (b).
Below, we can restrict our search space for consistent cost functions to affine functions and homoge-
neously exponential functions. In the next section, we will show that both classes of functions are consistent.
4 Consistent Cost Functions
Affine Functions. We will first show below that games with affine cost functions are exact potential games
and, thus, they possess a PNE and the α-FIP for every α > 0.
Proposition 4.1. Let G be a congestion game with variable demands and affine cost functions (cr)r∈R. Then,
the function P(x, d) = ∑i∈N Ui(di) − ∑r∈xi cr
(∑
j∈{1,...,i}:r∈x j d j
)
di is an exact potential function. Thus, G
possesses a PNE and the α-FIP for every α > 0.
Proof. We consider affine cost functions, that is, cr(ℓ) = arℓ + br, ar > 0, br ≥ 0. We define the
function c≤ir (x, d) = cr
(∑
j∈{1,...,i}:r∈x j d j
)
and rewrite P(x, d) as P(x, d) = ∑i∈N Pi(x, d), where Pi(x, d) =
Ui(di) − ∑r∈xi c≤ir (x, d). Let G = (N, ¯X, π) be an arbitrary congestion game with variable demands and let
(x, d), (y,∆) ∈ ¯X be two strategy profiles such that (x, d) = ((xk, dk), (x−k, d−k)) and (y,∆) = ((yk,∆), (x−k, d−k))
for some xk, yk ∈ Xk, dk,∆k ∈ R>0, x−k ∈ X−k and d−k ∈ Rn−1>0 . We notice that Pi(y,∆) = Pi(x, d) for all
i < k. Now consider a player i > k. When computing Pi(y,∆) − Pi(x, d), we observe that all costs cor-
responding to resources not contained in xk ∪ yk cancel out. For each resource r ∈ (xi ∩ xk) \ yk, we
have −c≤ir (y,∆) + c≤ir (x, d) = ar dk di. Analogously, for each resource r ∈ (xi ∩ yk) \ xk, it holds that
−c≤ir (y,∆) + c≤ir (x, d) = −ar∆k di. For each resource r ∈ xi ∩ xk ∩ yk, we have −c≤ir (y,∆) + c≤ir (x, d) =
ar(dk − ∆k)di. Hence, for all players i > k, we have
Pi(y,∆) − Pi(x, d) = −
∑
r∈xi∩yk
ar ∆k di +
∑
r∈xi∩xk
ar dk di.
Moreover, we can calculate straightforwardly that
Pk(y,∆) − Pk(x, d) = Uk(∆k) − Uk(dk) − ∆k
∑
r∈yk
cr
( ∑
j∈{1,...,k−1}:r∈y j
d j + ∆k
)
+ dk
∑
r∈xk
cr
( ∑
j∈{1,...,k−1}:r∈x j
d j + dk
)
− ∆k
∑
r∈yk
br + dk
∑
r∈xk
br.
We thus obtain
P(y,∆) − P(x, d)
=
∑
i∈N
Pi(y,∆) −
∑
i∈N
Pi(x, d)
= Uk(∆k) − Uk(dk) − ∆k
∑
r∈yk
ar
( ∑
j∈{1,...,k−1}: f∈x j
d j + ∆k
)
+ dk
∑
r∈xk
ar
( ∑
j∈{1,...,k−1}:r∈y j
d j + dk
)
− ∆k
∑
r∈yk
br + dk
∑
r∈xk
br +
n∑
i=k+1

∑
r∈yi∩yk
ar ∆k di +
∑
r∈xi∩xk
ar dk di

=
∑
r∈yk
ar
( ∑
j∈N\{k}:r∈x j
d j + ∆k
)
∆k −
∑
r∈xk
ar
( ∑
j∈N\{k}:r∈x j
d j + dk
)
dk − ∆k
∑
f∈yk
br + dk
∑
r∈xk
br
= πk(y,∆) − πk(y, d).
Thus, P is an exact potential of G.
Since player i’s marginal utility U′i (d) is concave, there is Di ∈ R>0 such that U′i (d) < 2 ac d + b for
all c ∈ C and d > Di. By Lemma 3.1, the demands di > Di are not payoff maximizing and thus strictly
dominated. Hence, we can effectively restrict the set of demands of player i to [0, Di]. Because the potential
function P is continuous, P attains its maximum on

i∈N
(
Xi × [0, Di]
)
and we derive that every congestion
game with variable demands and affine costs admits a PNE.
To show the α-FIP, let x¯0 ∈ ¯X be arbitrary and let γ = (x¯0, x¯1, . . . ) be an α-improvement path starting
in x¯0. For the maximum of P we have m = maxx¯∈i∈N (Xi,[0,Di])] P(x¯) = maxx¯∈i∈N (Xi,[0,R≥0])] P(x¯). Since
P is an exact potential we have P(x¯k+1) − P(x¯k) > α. If γ is infinite, we obtain that P(x¯k) > m for all
k > (m − P(x¯0)) / α, which is a contradiction. 
Homogeneously Exponential Cost Functions In the following lemma, we will prove that for every im-
provement step at least one of the following actions also yields an improvement: (i) adapting the configura-
tion only while leaving the demand constant, (ii) adapting the demand only while leaving the used resources
constant. Formally, we call a subset I′ ⊆ I of improving moves essential if {y¯ : (x¯, y¯) ∈ I′} = ∅ implies
{y¯ : (x¯, y¯) ∈ I} = ∅ for all x¯ ∈ ¯X. Such subsets exist since the set of improving moves I itself is essential.
A function P : ¯X → R is called a local essential potential of G if x¯ ∈ argmaxy¯∈ ¯XP(y¯) implies {y¯ : (x¯, y¯) ∈
I′} = ∅. Clearly, x¯ is a PNE.
Lemma 4.2. Let G be congestion game with variable demands and homogeneously exponential costs. Then,
I′ =
{((x, d), (yi, x−i, d)) ∈ I} ∪ {((x, d), (x,∆i, d−i)) ∈ I} is an essential subset of improving moves.
Proof. For contradiction, let i ∈ N and (yi,∆i) ∈ ¯Xi be such that ((x, d), (yi, x−i,∆i, d−i) ∈ I but both
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((x, d), (yi, x−i, d)) < I′ and ((x, d), (x,∆i, d−i)) < I′. Then, we obtain
πi
((xi,∆i), x¯−i)−πi((xi, di), x¯−i) = Ui(∆i)−Ui(di)−∆ieφ∆i∑
r∈xi
ar e
φℓr(x¯−i)+dieφdi
∑
r∈xi
ar e
φℓr(x¯−i) ≤ 0, (8)
πi
((yi, di), x¯−i)−πi((xi, di), x¯−i) = − dieφdi∑
r∈yi
ar e
φℓr(x¯−i)+dieφdi
∑
r∈xi
ar e
φℓr(x¯−i) ≤ 0, (9)
πi
((yi,∆i), x¯−i)−πi((xi, di), x¯−i) = Ui(∆i)−Ui(di)−∆ieφ∆i∑
r∈yi
ar e
φℓr(x¯−i)+dieφdi
∑
r∈xi
ar e
φℓr(x¯−i) > 0, (10)
where the latter inequality expresses the fact that
((x, d), (yi, x−i,∆i, d−i)) ∈ I(i). Subtracting (8) from (10)
we obtain −∆ieφ∆i
(∑
r∈yi ar e
φℓr(x¯−i) −
∑
r∈xi ar e
φℓr(x¯−i)
)
> 0, which is a contradiction to (9). 
We will use the above Lemma to prove that every congestion game with variable demands and homoge-
neously exponential costs admits a local essential potential and thus a PNE.
Proposition 4.3. Let C be a set of homogeneously exponential cost functions. Then, C is consistent.
Proof. Let G be a game with homogeneously exponential cost functions. Consider the function Φ(x, d) =∑
i∈N
∫ di
0
U′i (s)
φs+1 ds −
∑
r∈R cr(ℓ(x, d)). With the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 4.1 we can
find Di ∈ R>0 such that d∗i < Di holds for all i ∈ Nin every equilibrium (x∗, d∗) of G. We claim that
x¯∗ = (x∗, d∗) ∈ arg max(x,d)∈i∈N (xi ,[0,Di]) P(x, d) is a PNE. Referring to Lemma 4.2 it is sufficient to show
that there is no improving move from (x∗, d∗) in which exclusively either the demand or the configuration of
a single player is adapted.
Because (x∗, d∗) maximizes Φ, the optimality conditions give ∂Φ(x∗, d∗) / ∂d∗i = 0, if d∗i > 0 and
∂Φ(x∗, d∗) / ∂d∗i ≤ 0, if d∗i = 0. We thus obtain the equations U′i (d∗i ) = (φd∗i + 1)
∑
r∈xi are
ℓr(x∗ ,d∗) =
∂d∗i
∑
r∈xi are
φℓ(x∗,d∗) / ∂d∗i , if d∗i > 0, and U′i (d∗i ) ≤ (φd∗i + 1)
∑
r∈xi are
ℓr(x∗ ,d∗) = ∂d∗i
∑
r∈xi are
φℓ(x∗,d∗) / ∂d∗i , if
d∗i = 0. Hence, the demand d
∗
i is optimal for player i for the configuration profile x
∗ implying that there is
no improving move in which a player solely changes her demand.
Suppose that there is a player k that changes profitably her configuration from x∗k to some yk. Then,
Φ
((yk, d∗k), x¯∗−k) − Φ((x∗k, d∗k ), x¯∗−k) =
( 1
eφd
∗
k
− 1
)(∑
r∈yk
are
φℓ(x¯∗)) + (1 − 1
eφd
∗
k
)(∑
r∈x∗k
are
φℓ(x¯∗))
=
( 1
d∗k
−
1
d∗ke
φd∗k
)(
− d∗k
∑
r∈yk
are
φℓ(x¯∗) + d∗k
∑
r∈x∗k
are
φℓ(x¯∗))
=
( 1
d∗k
−
1
d∗ke
φd∗k
)(
πk
((yk, dk), x¯−k) − πk((x∗k, dk), x¯−k)
)
> 0,
which is a contradiction to the fact that (x∗, d∗) maximizes Φ. We derive that (x∗, d∗) is a PNE. 
We are now ready to state the main result of this paper.
Theorem 4.4. A set C ⊆ C2(R≥0) of strictly increasing cost functions is consistent if and only if one of the
following cases holds: (i) C contains only affine functions c(ℓ) = a ℓ + b, a > 0,b ≥ 0; (ii) C contains only
homogeneously exponential functions c(ℓ) = a eφℓ, a, φ > 0, where φ is a universal constant of all functions
in C.
Proof. Corollary 3.4 and Proposition 3.9 imply the ”only if” part. Proposition 4.1 and Proposition 4.3 prove
the ”if” part. 
The characterization of the set of FIP consistent cost functions follows from Proposition 3.7.
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Theorem 4.5. A set C ⊆ C2(R≥0) of cost functions is FIP consistent if and only if C contains only affine
functions c(ℓ) = a ℓ + b with a > 0, b ≥ 0.
Our characterizations also hold for network congestion games thus resolving the question raised in. [23].
5 Pure Nash Equilibria in the Uniform Cost Model
In the last section, we assumed that the cost function of a resource defines a per-unit-price for every player
on that resource. Thus, the actual cost for a player is the product of the per-unit-price and the demand of
that player. In this section, we will assume that the cost functions on the resources define uniform costs (or
per-player costs), that is, every player pays the same costs regardless of her demand.
Let M = (N,R, X, (cr)r∈R) be a congestion model and let (Ui)i∈N be a collection of utility functions. We
define the corresponding uniform congestion game with variable demands as the strategic game G(M) =
(N, ¯X, π), where ¯X = (X,R≥0), π = i∈N πi and πi
(
x, d) = Ui(di) − ∑r∈xi cr(ℓr(x, d)), and ℓr((x, d)) =∑
j∈N:r∈x j d j.
Most surprisingly, in the uniform cost model, there is a congestion game with variable demands and
linear cost functions without PNE, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 2 (Uniform cost game without PNE). Consider the congestion model M = (N,R, X, (cr)r∈R),
where N = {1, 2} and R = {1, . . . , 46}. Each resource has the cost function c(ℓ) = ℓ. We define X =i∈N Xi,
where
X1 =
{
{r1, . . . , r22}, {r23, . . . , r39}
}
X2 =
{
{r23, . . . , r30} ∪ {r40, . . . , r46}, {r1, . . . , r4} ∪ {r31, . . . , r39}
}
.
For ease of exposition, we define R1,2 = {r1, . . . , r4}, R1,0 = {r5, . . . , r22}, R2,1 = {r23, . . . , r30}, R2,2 =
{r31, . . . , r39}, R0,1 = {r40, . . . , r46}. The strategy space is depicted in Figure 4.
For the utility functions U1 and U2 of player 1 and 2, respectively we chose strictly concave, increasing
and twice continuously differentiable functions satisfying
U1(0) = 0, U1(1) = 32, U1(2) = 53,
U′1(1) = 22, U′1(2) = 17
U2(0) = 0, U2(1) = 32, U2(2) = 46,
U′2(1) = 15 U′2(2) = 13.
Clearly, such functions always exists, for instance one can choose polynomials of degree seven to fit the
equations above. These functions are shown in Figure 5.
Using that the cost functions are equal to the identity, the equilibrium conditions for the Nash equilib-
rium (x∗, d∗) imply U′i (d∗i ) = |xi| for d∗i > 0. Said differently, in any PNE in which player i plays configuration
x∗i and has positive demand d∗i , the equation d∗i = U′−1i (|x∗i |) holds. Note that since the utility functions are
strictly concave, the derivatives U′1 and U
′
2 are convertible and thus their inverse functions U′−11 and U′−12
are well-defined. Now, remark that the utility functions Ui of player i is chosen such that in equilibrium
d∗i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, since
U′−11 (|R1,2 ∪ R1,0|) = 1, U′−11 (|R2,1 ∪ R2,2|) = 2,
U′−12 (|R2,1 ∪ R0,1|) = 1, U′−12 (|R1,2 ∪ R2,2|) = 2.
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Figure 4: Strategies of the uniform cost congestion game with variable demands with identity cost and no PNE considered in
Example 2. The gray shaded resources are important in the construction of Proposition 5.2.
Thus, for any equilibrium (x∗, d∗) we get
(x∗1, d∗1) ∈
{
(R1,2 ∪ R1,0, 1), (R2,1 ∪ R2,2, 2), (R1,2 ∪ R1,0, 0), (R2,1 ∪ R2,2, 0)},
(x∗2, d∗2) ∈
{(
R2,1 ∪ R0,1, 1
)
,
(
R1,2 ∪ R2,2, 2
)
,(
R2,1 ∪ R0,1, 0
)
,
(
R1,2 ∪ R2,2, 0
)}
.
Remark that the latter two strategies of players 1 and 2 with zero demand are indistinguishable in the sense
that they always give the same payoff to every player. First, we will show that there is no PNE in which both
players chose a strictly positive demand. We calculate that
π1
((R2,1 ∪ R2,2, 2), (R2,1 ∪ R0,1, 1)) − π1((R1,2 ∪ R1,0, 1), (R2,1 ∪ R0,1, 1))
= U1(2) − 3 · |R2,1| − 2 · |R2,2| − (U1(1) − 1 · |R1,2| − 1 · |R1,0|)
=
(53 − 3 · 8 − 2 · 9) − (32 − 1 · 4 − 1 · 18) = 11 − 10 = 1,
and similarly
π2
((R2,1 ∪ R2,2, 2), (R1,2 ∪ R2,2, 2)) − π2((R2,1 ∪ R2,2, 2), (R2,1 ∪ R0,1, 1)) = 2 − 1 = 1,
π1
((R1,2 ∪ R1,0, 1), (R1,2 ∪ R2,2, 2)) − π1((R2,1 ∪ R2,2, 2), (R1,2 ∪ R2,2, 2)) = 2 − 1 = 1,
π2
((R1,2 ∪ R1,0, 1), (R2,1 ∪ R0,1, 1)) − π2((R1,2 ∪ R1,0, 1), (R1,2 ∪ R2,2, 2)) = 17 − 16 = 1,
establishing that neither of these 4 strategy profiles constitutes a PNE. Note that each of these strategy
profiles guarantees a strictly positive payoff to each player while choosing d∗i = 0 gives a payoff equal to
zero. Hence, both players have an incentive to choose a positive demand which together with the observation
that γ is an improvement cycle establishes that this game does not admit a PNE.
This is in stark contrast to Proposition 4.1 establishing that every congestion game with variable de-
mand in the proportional cost model possesses a PNE. We will shed light on this dichotomy by obtaining a
complete characterization.
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(a) Utility function of player 1.
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Figure 5: Utility functions U1 and U2 of players 1 and 2, respectively, considered in Example 2.
Necessary Conditions. As in the proportional cost model, we can restrict our search space for consis-
tent cost functions to affine and exponential functions. With a slight modification in the proof of Propo-
sition 3.3 one can establish that every functions that is not consistent w.r.t. weighted congestion games is
also non-consistent w.r.t. uniform congestion games with variable demands. Like this, we get the following
immediate corollary.
Corollary 5.1. If C ⊆ C2(R≥0) is consistent w.r.t. uniform congestion games with variable demands then one
of the following cases holds: (i) C contains only affine functions; (ii) C contains only exponential functions.
While the upper result seemingly establishes a structural similarity between the games with proportional
costs, it turns out that they behave completely different. As already mentioned, uniform congestion games
variable demands and affine costs need not possess a PNE. This holds even for two player games in which
the cost function cr on all resources r ∈ R equals the identity as illustrated in Example 2. Using this example
as a blueprint, one can show the following more general result.
Proposition 5.2. Any affine function is not consistent w.r.t. uniform congestion games with variable de-
mands.
Proof. In Example 2, we construct a uniform congestion game G with variable demands and costs equal to
c(ℓ) = ℓ that does not admit a PNE. Now, consider the game Ga with utility functions Ua1 and Ua2 , where
Ua1 = a U1 and U
a
2 = a U2 for some a > 0. Furthermore, we set the cost on all resources equal to c(ℓ) = a ℓ.
Clearly, the utility of every player in G is equal to the scaled utility of that player in Ga. Thus, neither G nor
Ga admit a PNE.
In order to construct a game Ga,b with costs equal to c(ℓ) = a ℓ + b we introduce a third player with
utility equal to Ua,b3 = g
σ
((0, 0), (b, M)) and a single configuration X3 = {{31, . . . , 35} ∪ {40, 41, 42}}. For
illustration, these resources are shaded gray in Fig 4. With similar arguments as before, we get that for
sufficiently large M and sufficiently small σ, player 3 will choose her demand d∗3 in any equilibrium (if such
exists) such that d∗3 ∈ (b − σ, b + σ). We define the utility functions Ua,b1 and Ua,b2 in the game Ga,b by
Ua,b1 = U
a
1 +22b and U
a,b
2 = U2 +18b. It is easy to check that the difference of the payoffs of the games G
a,b
and Ga, respectively, goes to 0 as σ → 0. Using that the payoff functions of the game Ga,b are continuous
with respect to σ, we derive that the game Ga,b does not possess a PNE. 
In order to show a negative result for inhomogenously exponential functions, we will follow the same
line of argumentation as for the proportional cost model. To this end, we first introduce the notion of uniform
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congestion games with resource dependent demands. Let M = (N, F, X, (cr)r∈R) be a congestion model and
let (di,r)i∈N,r∈R be a matrix of facility-dependent demands. The corresponding uniform congestion game with
resource dependent demands is the strategic game G(M) = (N, X, π), where π is defined as π = i∈N πi,
πi(x) = ∑r∈xi cr(ℓr(x)) and ℓr(x) = ∑ j∈N:r∈x j d j,r.
Proposition 5.3. Any inhomogenously exponential function is not consistent w.r.t. uniform congestion games
with resource dependent demands.
Proof. Let c(ℓ) = a eφℓ + b with a, φ ∈ R>0 and b ≥ −a and consider the congestion model M =
(N,R, X, (cr)r∈R) with 5 players and 7 resources R = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7}. Only the first two players
i ∈ {1, 2} have two strategies and will be called non-trivial players in the sequel of this proof. Their strategy
spaces are given by
X1 = {x1, xˆ1}, where x1 = {r1, r2}, xˆ1 = {r3, r4},
X2 = {x2, xˆ2}, where x2 = {r1, r2, r3}, xˆ2 = {r5, r6, r7}.
The players 3, 4, and 5 have only one strategy and serve only to increase the costs on some of the resources.
They will be called trivial players. Their strategies are given by X3 =
{
x3
}
=
{
{r1, r2}
}
, X4 =
{
x4
}
=
{
r4},
X5 =
{
x5
}
=
{
{r5, r6, r7}
}
. Observe that the strategies of the two non-trivial players are disjoint. For the non-
trivial players i ∈ {1, 2} and the parameters p, q ∈ N>0, we set di,r = 2 ln 2φ for all r ∈ xi and di,r = (2 + pq ) ln2φ
for all r ∈ xˆi.
We set the demand of the non-trivial players 3, 4, and 5 equal to d3,r = ln(a3) / φ, d4,r = ln(a4) / φ, and
d5,r = ln(a5) / φ for all r ∈ R, where a3, a4, a5 > 1 will be chosen such that
γ =
((x1, x2, x3, x4, x5), (xˆ1, x2, x3, x4, x5), (xˆ1, xˆ2, x3, x4, x5), (x1, xˆ2, x3, x4, x5), (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5))
is an improvement cycle. Calculating the costs of the respective deviating non-trivial player in γ, we obtain
the following necessary and sufficient conditions
25 a3 > 24+p/q a4 + 22+p/q (U1)
23 a3 + 24+p/q a4 > 3 · 22+p/q a5 (U2)
22+p/q a4 + 22+p/q > 23 a3 (U3)
3 · 22+p/q a5 > 25 a3 + 22 a4. (U4)
Combining (U2) and (U4) into one inequality, we obtain
2 a3 + 22+p/q a4 > 3 · 2p/q a5 > 23 a3 + a4
⇒ a3 <
(
2
3
2p/q − 16
)
a4. (U2’)
Inequalities (U1) and (U3) give rise to
1
2
2p/q a4 +
1
8
2p/q < a3 (U1’)
a3 <
1
2
2p/q a4 +
1
2
2p/q (U3’)
respectively. It is left to show that the inequalities (U1’), (U2’), and (U3’) can be satisfied simultaneously.
Let us choose a4 > max{21+p/q, 32 (1+ 12p/q−1 )} and a3 = 12 2p/q a4+ 14 2p/q. Then, (U1’) and (U3’) are satisfied
trivially. As for (U2’), note that
2
3 2
p/q a4 −
1
6 a4 − a3 =
2
3 2
p/q a4 −
1
6 a4 −
1
2
2p/q a4 −
1
4
2p/q =
1
6 a4
(
2p/q − 1
)
−
1
4
2p/q > 0
22
by the choice of a4. Finally, we set a5 = 13·2p/q
((21+p/q − 1)a4 − 3a3). It is left to show, that a3, a4, and a5 are
not smaller than 1. Since a4 > 21+p/q by definition, a3 > 2p/q > 1. As for a5, inequality (U4) gives rise to
2p/qa5 > 2 a3 implying a5 > 1.
Thus, we have found a3, a4, a5 > 1 such that γ is an improvement cycle, establishing that the corre-
sponding game does not admit a PNE. 
Using the same idea as in the proof of Proposition 3.9 the non-consistency of inhomogenously exponen-
tial functions carries over to uniform congestion games with variable demands.
Proposition 5.4. Any inhomogenously exponential function is not consistent w.r.t. uniform congestion games
with variable demands.
Sufficient Conditions. For uniform congestion games with variable demands and homogenous exponen-
tial costs, we establish the existence of a PNE by deriving an essential potential function which generalize
the potentials considered by Monderer and Shapley [21]. Recall that a subset I′ ⊆ I of improving moves is
essential if {y¯ : (x¯, y¯) ∈ I′} = ∅ implies {y¯ : (x¯, y¯) ∈ I} = ∅ for all x¯ ∈ ¯X. This definition motivates the concept
of essential generalized ordinal potentials. Let G = (N, ¯X, π) be a strategic game. The function P : ¯X → R
is called an essential generalized ordinal potential of G if for all strategy profiles x¯ ∈ ¯X there is an essential
subset of improving moves I′ such that (x¯, y¯) ∈ I′ implies P(y¯) > P(x¯). Clearly, a maximizer of P is a PNE.
Proposition 5.5. Let G = (N, ¯X, π) be a uniform congestion game with variable demands and homogenous
exponential costs. Then, G admits an essential generalized ordinal potential and possesses a PNE.
Combining Corollary 5.1 and Propositions 5.2, 5.4, and 5.5, we state the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.6. A set C ⊆ C2(R≥0) of cost functions is consistent w.r.t. uniform congestion games with
variable demands if and only if C contains only homogeneously exponential functions. There is no set of
FIP consistent functions.
6 Conclusions and Open Problems
We considered the fundamental problem of the existence of PNE and convergence properties of improvement
dynamics in congestion games with variable demands. We obtained several characterizations of the cost
structure with respect to the existence of PNE and the α-FIP. Since our model is general enough to closely
capture many elements of practical applications, we are confident that our results help understanding the
behavior of myopic play in real systems. We conclude the paper by outlining several research directions that
deserve further attention.
While the present work addressed the existence of PNE (and the α-FIP) with respect to the cost structure
(without constraining the strategy space and the utility functions), it is natural to ask for combinatorial
properties of the strategy spaces (such as singletons strategies or strategies given by bases of a matroid) that
ensure the existence of PNE for general cost functions. Alternatively, one can restrict the set of feasible
utility functions (e.g., assume linear functions) and ask for the existence of PNE. Also the case of symmetry
within the set of players (with respect to their utilities, their strategies or both) is open.
Another research direction is to investigate the price of anarchy (stability) in congestion games with
variable demands. It would be interesting to characterize the price of anarchy for affine cost functions,
because in this case there always exists a PNE.
The design and the analysis of improvement dynamics is fundamental and deserves further investigation.
Because our model captures many elements of TCP/IP routing protocols (involving unsplittable routings and
elastic demands), it is of practical importance to further investigate the stability and scalability of distributed
improvement dynamics.
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